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THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT AND ITS
APPLICATION TO HIGH SCHOOL, COLLEGIATE
AND PROFESSIONAL ATHLETICS
JONATHAN R. COOK*
I. INTRODUCTION
As the Professional Golfers Association Tour ("PGA") has re-
cently found, the scope of the Americans with Disabilities Act
("ADA") is broad enough to alter one of the most traditional parts
of the game of golf - walking eighteen holes.'
On July 26, 1990, Congress reacted to segregation and discrim-
ination against the 43,000,000 Americans with disabilities by enact-
ing the ADA.2 This landmark legislation was intended to protect
mentally and physically disabled individuals from intentional dis-
crimination and benign social neglect.3 Since its inception, this leg-
islation has substantially affected most, if not all, professional teams,
the National Collegiate Athletic Association ("NCAA"), and high
school athletic associations. By declaring that "the NCAA operates
* Associate, Rice, Fowler, Rodriguez, Kingsmill, and Flint, L.L.P. University of
Richmond, B.A.; Loyola University School of Law, J.D.
1. See Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc., 994 F. Supp. 1242, 1242 (D. Or. 1998) ("Mar-
tin IT).
2. &e42 U.S.C. § 12101 (a) (1994) (recognizing discrimination in areas of em-
ployment, housing, public accommodations, communication, recreation, institu-
tionalization, health services, voting, and access to public serices); see also Irving
Kenneth Zola, The Sleeping Giant in Our Midst: Redefining "Persons With Disabilities,"
in IMPLEMENTING THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES AcT, xvii (Lawrence 0. Gostin
& Henry A. Beyer eds., 1993) (estimating number of disabled Americans to be as
high as 65,000,000).
3. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101(a)(5),(7) (1994); see also Crowder v. Kitagawa, 81
F.3d 1480, 1480 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that Hawaii's requirement to quarantine
carnivorous animals for 120 days upon entering state prevents visually-impaired
persons who rely on guide dogs from enjoying state services, violating ADA).
(243)
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a place of public accommodation;" 4 allowing a waiver of a high
school athletic association's age-eligibility rule;5 or, most recently,
by permitting injunction of the PGA Tour from enforcing its age
old "no cart" rule in professional competitions;6 the ADA and the
regulations implementing it have forced all private and public enti-
ties to reexamine the nature of their rules, procedures and tradi-
tions for possible violations of this law.7
This article provides an update on the current application of
the ADA to high school, collegiate and professional sports. More
specifically, it reviews the parameters of the ADA and outlines how
an athlete can succeed on a claim under the ADA. This section
includes recent case law addressing Title II and Title III claims in
the sports context. In addition, this article analyzes Martin v. PGA
Tour, Inc.,8 and explores possible ramifications that the ADA may
have on high school, collegiate and professional athletics.
II. HISTORY OF THE AMERICANS wrrH DISABILITIES Acr
The passage of the ADA in 1990 was not the first attempt by
Congress to remedy historical discrimination against disabled indi-
viduals. Rather, in 1973, Congress passed the Rehabilitation Act.9
Although the Rehabilitation Act eradicated discrimination against
disabled individuals by public entities that receive federal fund-
ing,10 it left the private sector largely, if not entirely, unregulated in
the fight to abolish this discrimination."
4. Tatum v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 992 F. Supp. 1114, 1121 (E.D. Mo.
1998) (holding that NCAA operates as place of public accommodation and, there-
fore, falls under Title III of ADA).
5. SeeJohnson v. Fla. High Sch. Activities Ass'n, Inc., 899 F. Supp. 579, 586
(M.D. Fla. 1995), vacated as moot, 102 F.3d 1172 (lth Cir. 1997) (holding that
waiver of age-eligibility rule advances interest in eliminating discrimination and
does not undermine purposes of safety and fairness).
6. See Martin II, 994 F. Supp. 1242, 1253 (D. Or. 1998) (holding that disabled
professional golfer can use golf cart during competitions, despite PGA Tour rule
denying cart use).
7. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7) (1998).
8. Martin II, 994 F. Supp. at 1242 (considering ADA suit alleging discrimina-
tion of disabled golfer participating in PGA tour); Martin v. PGA Tour, 984 F.
Supp. 1320 (D. Or. 1998) ("Martin 1") (considering applicability of ADA to PGA
Tour).
9. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1994).
10. See id. (prohibiting discrimination based on qualified individual's disabil-
ity under programs or activities receiving federal assistance).
11. See Katie M. Burroughs, Learning Disabled Student Athletes: A Sporting Chance
Under the ADA ?, 14 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 57, 64 (1997) (examining ambi-
guity in ADA's application to learning disabled students and their athletic
eligibility).
[Vol. 6: p. 243
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Eventually, Congress recognized that new legislation was
needed to further level the playing field for these 43,000,000 indi-
viduals who were still encountering various forms of discrimination
in the private sector.12 Consequently, Congress enacted the ADA to
build "upon the foundation laid by the Rehabilitation Act by both
broadening the scope of the legislation and extending it to the pri-
vate sector."1
3
III. BRINGING A CLAIM UNDER THE ADA
To bring a claim under the ADA, an athlete must first demon-
strate that he falls within the ADA's definition of "disabled."14 The
ADA defines disability "as (A) a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such
individual; (B) a record of such impairment; or (C) being regarded
as having such an impairment." 15
If a claimant demonstrates that he is "disabled," the next step is
to determine under which tide of the ADA the claim should be
brought.16 One of the stated purposes of the ADA is to eliminate
discrimination against disabled Americans in all areas of society.
Accordingly, its drafters created separate titles to address and regu-
late discrimination in specific areas of society.1 7
In the sports context, a disabled athlete can bring an ADA
claim under three tides: (1) Title 1,1 which provides relief for dis-
crimination in the area of employment; (2) Title 11,19 which pro-
vides relief for discrimination in public services; and (3) Title 111,20
which provides relief for discrimination in public accommodations
and services operated by private entities. The majority of ADA
claims involving disabled athletes have been brought under Titles II
and 111.21 These two tides, while mutually exclusive, encompass
12. See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 101-558 at 3 (1990).
13. W.S. Miller, Ganden v. NCAA: How the NCAA's Efforts to Clean up Its Image
Have Created an Ethical and Legal Dilemma, 7 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 465, 467 (1997)
(examining NCAA eligibility rules as they apply to learning disabled students).
14. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1994).
15. Sne id.
16. SeeJohn E. Theuman, Annotation, Validity, Under Rehabilitation Act orAmer-
icans With Disabilities Act, of Rules or Laws Limiting Participation in Interscholastic Sports
to Those Below Specified Age, 143 A.L.R. Fed. 567, 2a (1998).
17. See Mary L. Topliff, Annotation, Remedies Available Under Americans With
Disabilities Act (42 U.S.C.S. § 12101 et seq.), 136 A.L.R. Fed. 63, 2a (1997).
18. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117 (1994).
19. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12165 (1994).
20. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181-12189 (1994).
21. See, e.g., Rhodes v. Ohio High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 939 F. Supp. 584, 589
(N.D. Ohio 1996).
1999] 245
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nearly every public and private entity in the country.2 2 Accordingly,
this article focuses only on these.
A. Sports-related Claims Under Title II of the ADA
Sports-related claims brought under Title II of the ADA gener-
ally involve athletic eligibility requirements imposed by high school
or collegiate athletic associations. 23 In a typical claim, an athlete
who has been required to repeat one or more grades due to a disa-
bility, requests a waiver of the various eligibility requirements. 24
These requirements usually prevent athletes from participating in
interscholastic athletics when: (1) the athlete reaches his nine-
teenth birthday on or before September 1st of the current school
year;25 (2) the athlete fails to meet the "eight-semester" rule;26 or
(3) the athlete fails to maintain certain academic standards, includ-
ing a minimum Grade Point Average and a base level of academic
credits. 27
If the athletic association denies an athlete's request for a
waiver, the athlete typically files suit under either Title II or Title III
of the ADA.28 The athlete then files a motion for a preliminary
injunction seeking to force the athletic association or school offi-
cials to allow him to participate in athletics. 29
The primary issue in these lawsuits is whether the athlete is a
"qualified individual with a disability."30 If the athlete proves he is
qualified and suffered discrimination because of his disability, the
22. See id.
23. See, e.g., McPherson v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, Inc., 119 F.3d 453
(6th Cir. 1997);Johnson v. Fla. High Sch. Activities Ass'n, Inc., 899 F. Supp. 579
(M.D. Fla. 1995), vacated as moot, 102 F.3d 1172 (lth Cir. 1997).
24. SeeJulia V. Kasperski, Comment, Disabled High School Athletes and The Right
to Participate: Are Age Waivers Reasonable Modifications Under The Rehabilitation Act
and the Americans with Disabilities Act?, 49 BAYLOR L. REV. 175, 175-76 (1997) (dis-
cussing learning disabled student's ADA claim).
25. See Sandison v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, Inc., 64 F.3d 1026, 1029
(6th Cir. 1995) (holding that age restriction did not violate ADA).
26. See McPherson, 119 F.3d at 455 (holding that "eight-semester" rule prohib-
its student from participating in athletics if student has completed eight semesters
of high school).
27. See Hoot v. Milan Area Sch., 853 F. Supp. 243, 245 (E.D. Mich. 1994)
(holding that genuine issue of fact exists regarding whether Michigan High School
Athletic Association discriminated against learning disabled student by denying
him privilege of playing football).
28. See Theuman, supra note 16, at 2a.
29. See Kasperski, supra note 24, at 176 (noting that disabled student sought
temporary restraining order barring athletic association from prohibiting him
from playing on team).
30. See Theuman, supra note 16, at 2.
[Vol. 6: p. 243
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burden shifts to the athletic association to prove that: (1) the eligi-
bility requirements are essential and neutral on their face and as
applied; and (2) the only accommodation that would enable the
athlete to participate in a sport requires a waiver of the eligibility
requirements that would fundamentally alter the nature of the
program. 31
Title II of the ADA provides that "no qualified individual with a
disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from partic-
ipation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or
activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any
such entity."3 2 Thus, to establish a prima facie claim under Tide II
of the ADA, a plaintiff must prove that: (1) he was injured by a
public entity; (2) he was a "qualified individual with a disability;"
and (3) that he has been excluded from participating in or benefit-
ting from the activities of the public entity.33
1. Public Entity
The plaintiffs first step in establishing a Tide II claim is prov-
ing that he was injured by a "public entity."34 The ADA defines a
"public entity" as any "department, agency ... or other instrumen-
tality of a State or States or local government."3 5
When determining whether an entity is "public" for purposes
of the ADA, courts have focused on the amount of authority dele-
gated to the entity from the state.36 Additionally, courts have con-
sidered whether athletic association members are public schools,
whether members use public facilities, and whether an athletic asso-
ciation can sanction public schools for violations of its rules.37 Be-
cause athletic associations typically act as state actors or
instrumentalities, courts consider them "public entities" subject to
Title II of the ADA. 3 8
31. See id.; see also Burroughs, supra note 11, at 89 (stating that student-athlete
must show that discrimination is "by reason of disability").
32. See 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (1994).
33. SeeJohnson v. Fla. High Sch. Activities Ass'n, Inc., 899 F. Supp. 579, 582
(M.D. Fla. 1995), vacated as moot, 102 F.Bd ii72 (11th Cir. 1997) (setting fuidi
elements plaintiff must prove to establish claim for discrimination under Tide II of
ADA).
34. 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (1994).
35. See 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1)(b).
36. See Rhodes v. Ohio Sch. Athletic Ass'n, Inc., 939 F. Supp. 584, 591 (N.D.
Ohio 1996) (stating that Ohio High School Athletic Association ("OHSSA") is in-
strumentality of State of Ohio); see also Johnson, 899 F. Supp. at 583.
37. See Rhodes, 939 F. Supp. at 591 (holding that OHSAA is public entity).
38. See, e.g., McPherson v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, Inc., 119 F.3d 453,
463; Rhodes, 939 F. Supp. at 589-90; Johnson, 899 F. Supp. at 583. But see Hoot v.
1999]
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However, although state universities are also considered public
entities under the ADA,3 9 the NCAA has been held to be a private
entity, "despite its seemingly 'public' status,"4° and thus can only be
sued under Title III of the ADA.41 Overall, the jurisprudence
strongly supports the proposition that only high school athletic as-
sociations or state universities are public entities under Title II of
the ADA.42
2. Qualified Individual With a Disability
The second step in proving a Title II claim is establishing that
the individual is a "qualified individual with a disability."43 The
ADA defines a "qualified individual with a disability" as one who
meets the essential eligibility requirement of a service or program
with or without reasonable modifications to rules, policies or prac-
tices.44 In other words, a disabled individual is "'otherwise quali-
fied' if reasonable accommodations would enable him to meet [the
essential requirements of the program]."45
As discussed earlier, if an individual fails to meet the necessary
or essential requirements of the program or service, it must be de-
termined whether a reasonable accommodation or modification
would enable him to become otherwise qualified. 46 An unreasona-
ble accommodation or modification is one that imposes undue fi-
nancial or administrative burdens or fundamentally alters the
nature of the privilege or program. 47
Milan Area Sch. 853 F. Supp. 243, 251 (E.D. Mich. 1994) (stating that court was
unable to determine whether high school athletic associations are public entities).
39. See Petersen v. Univ. of Wis. Bd. of Regents, 818 F. Supp. 1276, 1278 (W.D.
Wis. 1993) (holding that University of Wisconsin is public entity within meaning of
ADA).
40. See Miller, supra note 13, at 473.
41. See Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 191-97
(1998) (holding that NCAA's actions were not "state actions" performed "under
color of" state law, and therefore, NCAA was not state actor).
42. Because courts have addressed professional sports leagues under Title III,
it is unlikely that they would be considered "public entities" under Tide II.
43. 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (1994).
44. See 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2).
45. Pottgen v. Miss. State High Sch. Activities Ass'n, 40 F.3d 926, 929 (8th Cir.
1994).
46. SeeJohnson v. Fla. High Sch. Activities Ass'n, Inc., 899 F. Supp. 579, 584
(M.D. Fla. 1995), vacated as moot, 102 F.3d 1172 (11th Cir. 1997); see alsoAlexander
v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 301 (1985) (stating that otherwise qualified handicapped
individual must be provided with meaningful access to benefit that grantee's pro-
gram offers). But see Pottgen, 40 F.3d at 930.
47. See id. (stating that reasonable accommodation does not require institu-
tion to make substantial modifications to its standards); see also Dennin v. Conn.
Interscholastic Athletic Conference, Inc., 94 F.3d 96, 96 (2d Cir. 1996) (stating
[Vol. 6: p. 243
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While courts adjudicating sports-related claims have consist-
ently applied the "qualified individual with a disability" require-
ment, their interpretations lack uniformity and vary depending on
the facts of each case. The most common disagreement among the
courts involves when a waiver of an age-eligibility requirement fun-
damentally alters or imposes undue burdens on the program. 48
a. Courts Holding Waivers to be Unreasonable Accommodations
Some courts have held that the waiver of an age-eligibility re-
quirement does not constitute a reasonable accommodation under
Title II of the ADA. For example, in Sandison v. Michigan High
School Athletic Association, Inc.,49 the Sixth Circuit upheld the Michi-
gan High School Athletic Association's age-eligibility rule under Ti-
te II of the ADA.50 The court determined that the waiver of the
age restriction would fundamentally alter the sports program be-
cause it would place older students, who are generally larger, heav-
ier and more experienced, into the competitive field.51 In
addition, waiving the age-eligibility rule would cause an undue bur-
den by forcing high school coaches or physicians to make a compet-
itive unfairness determination regarding an athlete. 52 Therefore,
the court held that the waiver of the age requirement would be an
unreasonable accommodation, and accordingly, the plaintiffs were
not "qualified individuals" under Title II of the ADA.5 3
Similarly, in Pottgen v. Missouri State High School Activities Associa-
tions,54 the Eighth Circuit held that the waiver of an essential age-
eligibility standard constituted a "fundamental alteration in the na-
ture of the baseball program."55 The court reasoned that the age
requirement was essential to prevent competitive advantage, pro-
tect younger players from harm, discourage players from delaying
that waiver of requirement cannot fundamentally alter program or impose undue
burden).
48. See Johnson, 899 F. Supp. at 584 (discussing split of authority on this issue).
49. 64 F.3d 1026 (6th Cir. 1995).
50. See id. at 1036-37 (holding that students would not meet age eligibility rule
regardless of learning disability).
51. See id. at 1035 (discussing age requirement that prevents athletes from
participating in interscholastic sports if they turn nineteen before September 1st of
current school year).
52. See id. (finding that age requirements generally protect younger players
against injury and prevent unfair competitive advantages through use of older
players).
53. See id.
54. 40 F.3d 926 (8th Cir. 1994).
55. Id. at 930.
1999] 249
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their education and prevent red-shirting.56 Additionally, the court
held that "an individualized inquiry into the necessity of the age
[requirement]... [regarding the athlete was] inappropriate."57 Be-
cause no reasonable accommodation could be made, the athlete
was not "otherwise qualified" under Title II of the ADA.58
In Reaves v. Mills,59 the court denied an athlete's request for a
temporary restraining order, finding that the athlete was unlikely to
succeed on his ADA claim.60 In doing so, the court implicitly ruled
that a waiver of the age-eligibility rule for a learning disabled ath-
lete was not a reasonable accommodation under the ADA.61 Ac-
cordingly, the court denied the requested relief because the athlete
failed to meet the basic age requirement. 62
Most recently, in McPherson v. Michigan High School Athletic Asso-
ciation, Inc.,63 the Sixth Circuit reaffirmed its position that waiver of
the "eight-semester rule" was not a reasonable accommodation be-
cause it threatened one of the fundamental purposes of the rule -
the avoidance of "red-shirting."64 The court reasoned that the
waiver would fundamentally alter the basketball program and
would impose an immense financial and administrative burden on
the athletic association. 65 Further, the court warned that allowing
the waiver in this case "would have the potential of opening flood-
gates for waivers" for all learning disabled students who remain at
the school for longer than eight semesters. 66 Accordingly, the
court held that the athlete failed to establish a successful claim
under Title II of the ADA.67
56. See id. at 929 (stating that purposes are very important to any high school
athletic program).
57. Id. at 930.
58. See id. at 931 (holding that age limit is essential eligibility requirement and
modification was not reasonable).
59. 904 F. Supp. 120 (W.D.N.Y. 1995).
60. See id. at 123 (holding that age requirement did not violate ADA).
61. See Jason L. Thomas, Note, Through The ADA and The Rehabilitation Act,
High School Athletes Are Saying "Put Me In Coach": Sandison v. Mich. High Sch. Ath-
letic Ass'n, 65 U. Cn-. L. REV. 727, 737-38 (1997).
62. See Reaves, 904 F. Supp. at 123 (holding that plaintiffs would not be
granted injunctive relief).
63. 119 F.3d 453 (6th Cir. 1997).
64. See id. at 462-63 (holding that requiring waivers would place immense bur-
den on Michigan High School Athletic Association ("MHSAA")).
65. See id. (stating that administrative burden would be too great if MHSAA
had to distinguish between legitimate claims and claims based on trying to gain
unfair advantage).
66. See id.
67. See id. at 463 (ultimately holding that athlete's ADA claim failed).
[Vol. 6: p. 243
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b. Courts Holding Waivers to be Reasonable Accommodations
Other courts have held that waiving the age-eligibility require-
ment is a reasonable accommodation under Title II of the ADA. In
Johnson v. Florida High School Activities Association,68 the court held
that waiving the age-eligibility requirement did not fundamentally
alter the nature or purpose of the program. 69 The court reasoned
that allowing the athlete to participate in interscholastic athletics
did not undermine the purposes of the age requirement. 70 The
court specifically noted that because the athlete was not the largest
player on the field, his participation would not increase the poten-
tial for injury.71 Furthermore, the athlete was not a star athlete, nor
was he more experienced than the other players. 72 Because safety
and fairness would not be compromised, the court concluded that
waiving the age requirement constituted a "reasonable
accommodation." 73
Likewise, in Dennin v. Connecticut Interscholastic Athletic Confer-
ence, Inc.,74 the court held that waiving the age requirement would
not undermine any of the purposes of the association's rules. 75 The
court reasoned that the athlete posed no safety threat to himself or
others, and that he lacked any competitive advantage because he
consistently finished last in his swim meets. 76 Additionally, the
court reasoned that the waiver would not impose an undue burden
on the athletic association because it could pass any costs onto the
schools through fees. 77 Because granting a waiver to an athlete
68. 899 F. Supp. 579, 586 (M.D. Fla. 1995), vacated as moot, 102 F.3d 1172
(11th Cir. 1997).
69. See id. at 586 (holding that waiver of age requirement was reasonable
accommodation).
70. See id. at 584-85 (stating that purposes of promoting safety and maintain-
ing level playing field would not be undermined if waiver granted).
71. See id. at 585 (stating that athlete was not largest player on team playing
his position).
72. See Johnson, 899 F. Supp. at 585 (stating athlete was actually less exper-
ienced, with only three years of organized football).
73. Id. at 584-85. The court also distinguished Pottgen by stating that the
Pottgen court failed to provide any analysis as to the relationship between the age
requirement and the purposes behind the age requirement. See id.
74. 91.t F. Supp. 663, 668-69 (D. Conn. 1996), vacated as moot, 94 F.3d 96 (2d
Cir. 1996).
75. See id. at 668-69 (holding that granting waiver would not alter nature of
swimming program).
76. See id. at 669 (holding that athlete did not pose safety risk because swim-
ming is not contact sport and his education was not delayed to gain competitive
advantage).
77. See id. (noting that association routinely uses subjective case-by-case analy-
sis in considering waivers from transfer students, thus doing this for disabled stu-
dents would not be unduly burdensome).
1999]
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would not alter the nature of the swimming program, the court
deemed the athlete to be a qualified individual with a disability
under Title II of the ADA.78
In University Interscholastic League v. Buchanan,79 the court
agreed with the Dennin court's reasoning that it was in the public
interest to allow all students to play football.80 Similarly, the court
in Booth v. University Interscholastic League8 1 held that a waiver of the
age-eligibility requirement was a reasonable accommodation under
the Rehabilitation Act.82 Noting that the waiver would subject the
league to an increase in administrative costs, the court held that,
absent a showing that the disabled athlete's participation would
cause harm to the league or risk injury to other persons, the athlete
should be allowed to participate.8 3
Most recently, in Bingham v. Oregon School Activities Ass'n,84 the
court concluded that a waiver of the eight semester rule was a rea-
sonable modification to accommodate a student-athlete's learning
disability.8 5 The court disagreed with the defendant's assertion that
the waiver would impose an immense and undue burden on the
activities association because it already considered a student's disa-
bility when granting waivers of its age and grade rules of
eligibility.8 6
Furthermore, the Bingham court dismissed the McPherson
court's concern, that high school students may manipulate a learn-
ing disability claim for red-shirting purposes, as "flimsy."87 Because
the student did not have a competitive advantage over other stu-
dents, had not red-shirted, did not run afoul of the age-rule, and
greatly benefited from participating in sports, the court found that
allowing the student to play sports would not fundamentally alter
the nature of high school athletics.88
78. See id. at 668 (holding that athlete is "otherwise qualified" individual if he
can meet requirements of program with reasonable accommodations).
79. 848 S.W.2d 298, 302-03 (Tex. App. 1993).
80. See id. (affirming district court's ruling allowing students to play football).
81. No. Civ. A-90-CA-764, 1990 WL 484414, at *4 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 4, 1990).
82. See id. at *4 (holding that giving special consideration to plaintiff based on
disability is reasonable accommodation).
83. See id. (stating that Rehabilitation Act requires federally assisted programs
to do more for disabled individuals under Act).
84. 37 F. Supp. 2d 1189 (D. Or. 1999).
85. See id. at 1205.
86. See id. at 1203.
87. Id. at 1205.
88. See id.
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Due to the lack of uniformity between the courts regarding
whether a waiver of the age-eligibility requirement constitutes a fun-
damental alteration to an athletic program, the athlete's fate cur-
rently depends on the jurisdiction in which suit is filed.
B. Sports-related Claims Brought Under Title III
Like Title II claims, sports-related Title III claims generally in-
volve athletic eligibility requirements.8 9 As a result, the same analy-
sis used to determine whether the plaintiff is a qualified individual
with a disability.90 Unlike Title II, however, Title III affects private
entities that own, lease or operate places of public accommoda-
tion.91 If the court determines that the defendant operates a place
of public accommodation and that the defendant denied the plain-
tiff services or accommodations on the basis of the plaintiff's disa-
bility, the burden shifts to the defendant to establish that it could
not make reasonable modifications without fundamentally altering
the nature of the public accommodation. 92
1. Place of Public Accommodation, Generally
The ADA does not explicitly define a "place of public accom-
modation," but it does list twelve categories of private entities that it
considers "public accommodations."9 3 In addition, these categories
are limited to "places" of public accommodation. 94 The regulations
provide assistance by defining a "place of public accommodation"
89. See, e.g., Ganden v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, Inc., No. 96c 6953, 1996
WL 680000 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 21, 1996); Butler v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, Inc.,
No. C 96-1656D, 1996 WL 1058233 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 8, 1996).
90. See, e.g., Sandison v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, Inc., 64 F.3d 1026,
1036 (6th Cir. 1995).
91. See 42 U.S.C. § 12181(6), 12182(a) (1994) (defining various elements
used in subchapter and stating rule prohibiting discrimination by public accom-
modations); Elitt v. U.S.A. Hockey, 922 F. Supp. 217, 223 (E.D. Mo. 1996) (defin-
ing jurisdictional test that qualifies Title III claim).
92. See Dennin v. Connecticut Interscholastic Athletic Conference, Inc., 913
F. Supp. 663, 669 (D. Conn.), vacated as moot, 94 F.3d 96 (2d Cir. 1996) (discussing
differing analysis of courts and concluding individualized analysis is most appropri-
ate); see also 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a), (b) (2) (A) (ii) (stating general rule prohibiting
discrimination in public accommodations and specifically noting failure to make
reasonable modifications alleviating discrimination violates statute).
93. See 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7) (describing fifty examples of physical structures
and facilities).
94. See Stroutenborough v. Nat'l Football League, 59 F.3d 580, 582 (6th Cir.
1995). In this case, hearing impaired plaintiffs sued the National Football League
("NFL") and various television stations, alleging that the NFL's "Blackout Rule"
violated Title III of the ADA by discriminating against them in a disproportionate
way. The plaintiffs argued that they had no other access to the games via the tele-
communications technology.
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as "a facility, operated by a private entity, whose operations affect
commerce and fall within at least one of the twelve" categories.95
Thus, the statutes, case law, and regulations taken together estab-
lish that a "place of public accommodation" must affect commerce
and be operated by a private entity.96
The courts have had numerous opportunities to review this is-
sue in sports related claims. Specifically, courts have adjudicated
ADA Tide III claims involving membership organizations, including
the National Football League ("NFL"), hockey organizations, bicy-
cling organizations and the PGA tour.97 The NCAA, however, is the
most frequently sued membership organization in Title III claims.
The court rejected the plaintiffs' claim because none of the defendants fell
within any of the twelve "public accommodation" categories set forth in the ADA.
Additionally, the court noted that although a game is played and can be viewed in
a place of public accommodation, the television broadcast of a game does not
involve a "place of public accommodation."
95. See 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (1998). Facility is defined as "any portion of build-
ings, structures, sites, complexes, equipment.., or other real or personal prop-
erty." Id.
96. See Rhodes v. Ohio High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 939 F. Supp. 584, 591 (N.D.
Ohio 1996) (noting statutory definitions of this act "have been [collectively inter-
preted] to mean that a place of public accommodation must be operated by a
private entity"); Sandison v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 64 F.3d 1026, 1036
(6th Cir. 1995).
In Sandison, two high school students sued their respective high schools and
the Michigan High School Athletic Association alleging that the association's age-
eligibility requirement prevented them from equally participating in track events
held on public school grounds, thereby violating Tides II and III of the ADA. See
Sandison, 64 F.3d at 1036. In finding that Title III did not apply to the Michigan
Athletic Association, the court noted that public school grounds, and presumably
public parks, are operated by public rather than private entities. Thus, the defend-
ants did not fall within the definition of "a place of public accommodation," which
requires operation by a private entity. See id.
97. See Stroutenborough, 59 F.3d at 583 (finding that NFL, national, and local
television networks do not fall under the definition of places of accommodation);
Martin II, 994 F. Supp. 1242 (D. Or. 1998) (considering ADA suit alleging discrimi-
nation of disabled golfer participating on PGA Tour); Martin 1, 984 F. Supp. 1320
(D. Or. 1998) (considering applicability of ADA to PGA Tour); Brown v. 1995
Tenet ParaAmerica Bicycle Challenge, 959 F. Supp. 496, 499 (N.D. Ill. 1997)
(holding that bicycle association was not analogous to place of public accommoda-
tion because tour took place on public roads that were not owned, leased or oper-
ated by private entity); Elitt v. U.S.A. Hockey, 922 F. Supp. 217, 223 (E.D. Mo.
1996) (holding that membership organizations usually do not meet standard for
places of public accommodations unless they are affiliated with "place open to the
public" and membership is a "necessary predicate to [make] use of the facility")
(quoting Clegg v. Cult Awareness Network, 18 F.3d 752, 755 (9th Cir. 1995)).
In Clegg, a non-athletic and non-ADA case, an African-American member of
the Church of Scientology argued that a national nonprofit organization discrimi-
nated against him in violation of Tide II of the Civil Rights Act by failing to admit
him as a member in the organization. The court rejected the plaintiffs claim, and
noted that nothing in the record indicated that the defendant organization was
closely connected to a place or facility that was open to the public or that its mem-
bership was a necessary predicate to use of the any specific facility. See Cleggat 755.
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2. The NCAA
The NCAA requires that its member institutions "establish min-
imum academic eligibility standards for all prospective students" so
that they can attain "qualifier" status through certification by the
NCAA Initial Eligibility Clearinghouse.9 8 A student can attain
"qualifier" status for Division I competition if he or she: (1) gradu-
ated from high school; (2) passed at least thirteen "core courses;"
and (3) attained a minimum grade point average in those "core
courses."99 The grade point average requirement is determined by
a sliding scale based on the strength of the student's standardized
test scores. 100
Due to the NCAA requirements, learning disabled student-ath-
letes face a variety of eligibility problems when they want to partici-
pate in college sports. For example, learning-disabled students
frequently take special education courses in high school. 10 1 As a
result, they are often unable to complete the thirteen "core-course"
requirement.1 0 2 Because the NCAA does not treat special educa-
tion courses taken by learning disabled students as core courses,
10 3
it is extremely difficult for these athletes to participate in intercolle-
giate athletics unless they are specially granted "qualifier" status.
10 4
Other eligibility problems can arise if the student-athlete has taken
98. See Bowers v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 974 F. Supp. 459, 461 (D. N.J.
1997) (discussing "qualifier" status as factual background for issue of whether ath-
lete can participate in collegiate athletics); Ganden v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic
Ass'n, No. 96 C 6953, 1996 WL 680000, at *2 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (defining "qualifier"
status as enabling student to be eligible for participation in intercollegiate
athletics).
99. Bowers, 974 F. Supp. at 461 (noting minimum grade-point-average varies
based on strength of student's standardized test scores); Ganden, 1996 WL 680000,
at *2 (discussing that minimum grade-point-average is dependent upon standard-
ized college entrance examination scores).
100. See Burroughs, supra note 11, at 58 (discussing background facts on
learning disabled students and their participation in high school sports).
101. See id, at 85-86 (discussing NCAA eligibility requirements and their im-
pact on learning disabled students).
102. See Bowers, 974 F. Supp. at 461 (noting that although special education
courses are not considered "core," by-laws allow such courses to be considered
"core" if sufficient support is granted).
103. See id
104. See id, at 461-62. There are two exceptions to this rule: (1) the special
education courses are counted as core courses if the student's high school princi-
pal demonstrates that students in special education classes are expected to acquire
the same knowledge as students in the core courses; or (2) if the NCAA waives the
academic eligibility requirements based on objective evidence demonstrating cir-
cumstances in which a student's academic record warrants the waiver of the re-
quirements. See id. at 462.
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a nonstandard, untimed ACT, 10 5 or once in college, failed to earn
75% of semester hours during the academic year rather than dur-
ing the summer session. 10 6
Strict enforcement of these eligibility requirements has fre-
quently resulted in lawsuits against the NCAA, in which the athlete
seeks injunctive relief usually in the form a temporary restraining
order allowing him or her to participate in intercollegiate athletics.
a. The NCAA is Considered a Private Entity
In National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian,10 7 the Supreme
Court ruled that the NCAA is a private entity.' 0 8 The Court rea-
soned that the NCAA lacks governmental powers to facilitate inves-
tigations. 10 9 Specifically, "[the NCAA] has no power to subpoena
witnesses, to impose contempt sanctions, or to assert sovereign au-
thority over any individuals." 0 Since this decision, courts have fol-
lowed suit in recognizing that the NCAA is a private entity."'
Even though the NCAA is a private entity, the courts will not
subject it to Title III scrutiny unless it operates a "place of public
accommodation."" 2 In order to constitute a "place of public ac-
commodation," courts have held the organization's purpose must
105. See Tatum v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n., 992 F. Supp. 1114, 1116
(E.D. Mo. 1998).
106. See Matthews v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 79 F. Supp. 1199, 1199
(E.D. Wash. 1999). In this case, a learning disabled student-athlete sought a pre-
liminary injunction against the NCAA after it rejected his application for a waiver
of the 75/25 rule, which he alleged was a violation of Tide III of the ADA.
Although the court denied the plaintiffs request on the grounds that the ADA did
not apply to the NCAA, it stated that the continued waiver of this requirement
would completely dispense with its essential eligibility requirement.
107. 488 U.S. 179 (1988).
108. See id. at 196 (noting that NCAA is private entity when it represents inter-
est of its entire membership).
109. See i& at 197 (noting factors supporting contention that NCAA is not
public actor).
110. Id. (naming specific factors supporting statement that NCAA is private
actor in this case).
111. See Tatum v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 992 F. Supp. 1114, 1120-21
(E.D. Mo.). In this case, a learning disabled student-athlete sued the NCAA after it
refused to recognize a nonstandard, untimed ACT score relating to his status as a
"qualifier" under NCAA rules. In applying Tide III of the ADA to the NCAA, the
court noted that the NCAA was "properly viewed as a private entity." See also Bow-
ers v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 974 F. Supp. 459, 461 (D. N.J. 1997) (noting
that NCAA is private unincorporated association).
112. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181(7), 12182 (1994) (listing twelve categories of public
accommodations and noting that entity must fall within one of those twelve catego-
ries to be subject to ADA).
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be closely connected to a particular facility.' 13 A close connection
can be found when the membership organization functions as a
"ticket to admission to a facility or location;"11 4 when membership
to the organization "is a necessary predicate to [make] use of the
facility;" 115 or when the organization is affiliated with a particular
facility.116
Few courts have directly addressed whether the NCAA is or op-
erates a "place of public accommodation" under Title III of the
ADA.117 While earlier decisions found that the NCAA operates a
place of public accommodation, the most recent decision on this
issue has taken a contrary view. Because of this, whether courts
considering a disabled athlete's Title III lawsuit against the NCAA
will have proper subject matter jurisdiction will depend upon the
court in which suit is filed.
1. Courts Holding That the NCAA Operates a Place of Public
Accommodation
In Ganden v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, Inc.,118 the court
found that the NCAA operated a place of public accommodation
because it had a close connection to a number of public accommo-
dations - namely the athletic facilities of its member institutions. 19
Likewise, in Tatum v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n,' 20 the court
113. See Welsh v. Boy Scouts of Amer., 993 F.2d 1267, 1269 (7th Cir. 1993).
Although this case involved an alleged violation of Title II of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, it provides instructive analysis relating to Title III claims.
114. Id at 1272 (citing United States Jaycees v. Mass. Comm'n Against Dis-
crimination, 391 Mass. 594, 594 (1984)). This case involved Tide II of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.
115. Elitt v. U.S.A. Hockey, 922 F. Supp. 217, 223 (E.D. Mo. 1996) (quoting
Clegg v. Cult Awareness Network, 18 F.3d 752, 755 (9th Cir. 1994)). Because the
Clegg decision involved a Title II claim under the Civil Rights Act, it was cited only
for purpose of analogy.
116. See Ganden v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n., No. 96 C 6953, 1996 WL
680000, at *11 n.8 (N.D. Ill. 1996) ("If the NCAA 'operates' the swimming facili-
ties, then this is at least compelling evidence that it is 'closely connected' with
those facilities.").
117. See Tatum v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n., 992 F. Supp. 1114, 1121
(E.D. Mo. 1998); Ganden, 1996 WL 680000 at *11; Bowers v. Nat'l Collegiate Ath-
letic Ass'n. 974 F. Sup. 459, 461 (D. N.J. 1997). In this case, a learning disabled
student-athlete sued the NCAA under Title III of the ADA after it declined his
request for a waiver of the NCAA's "core course" eligibility requirement. Although
the court rejected the plaintiffs Title III claim because he failed to show a likeli-
hood of success, the court did not determine whether the NCAA operated a place
of public accommodation.
118. 1996 WL 680000, at *11.
119. See id. at *10 (noting that plaintiff must prove that NCAA "operates" facil-
ities within meaning of Title III).
120. 992 F. Supp. 1114 (E.D. Mo. 1998).
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found that the NCAA operated a public place of accommodation
due to the significant degree of control that it exerted over the ath-
letic facilities of its member institutions.
The NCAA frequently cites to Stroutenborough v. National Foot-
ball League,12 1 Elitt v. U.S.A. Hockey,1 2 2 Brown v. 1995 Tenet ParaAmer-
ica Bicycle Challenge,123 and Welsh v. Boy Scouts of America1 24 for the
proposition that membership organizations are not "places of pub-
lic accommodations." 125 Courts have consistently distinguished
these cases on the ground that they deal with "membership organi-
zations as organizations, [and] not as the operators of facilities that
can be considered places of public accommodation."' 26
2. Courts Holding That the NCAA Does Not Operate a Place of
Public Accommodation
Recently, in Matthews v. National Collegiate Athletic Association,127
the district court for the Eastern District of Washington became the
first court to hold that the ADA did not apply to the NCAA because
the Association did not operate a place of public accommoda-
tion.128 In doing so, the court reasoned that mere sanctioning of
events that occur in places of public accommodation does not con-
stitute the actual operation of those public places for purposes of
the ADA.' 29 Specifically, the court noted that the NCAA does not
regulate the hours of operation, specify staffing requirements,
maintain on-site or off-site employees, obtain revenue from opera-
tion, or determine who may enter their members' facilities.130 Be-
cause of this lack of control over the facilities used by its member
institutions, the court held that the NCAA does not operate any of
the places of public accommodation that its member institutions
use.13 1
121. 59 F.3d 580 (6th Cir. 1995).
122. 922 F. Supp. 217 (E.D. Mo. 1996).
123. 959 F. Supp. 496 (N.D. Ill. 1997).
124. 993 F.2d 1267 (7th Cir. 1993).
125. See Tatum 992 F. Supp. at 1119.
126. Butler v. Nat'l Collegiate Ass'n., No. C96-1656D, 1996 WL 1058233, at *4
(W.D. Wash. Nov. 8, 1996).
127. 79 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Wash. 1999).
128. See id. at 5.
129. See id.
130. See id.
131. See id.
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b. Substantive Analysis of Title III Claims Against the NCAA
Even though the courts have recently split on whether the
NCAA operates a "place of public accommodation," the NCAA has
fared well regarding the merits of Title III claims. As stated above,
once subject matter jurisdiction is established, the crux of the claim
becomes whether a disabled plaintiff is otherwise qualified to par-
ticipate in the program. 1 2 A plaintiff is an "otherwise qualified"
individual if, with reasonable accommodations, he can meet the
necessary or essential requirements of the program. 3
Ganden, Bowers, and Matthews are three illustrative cases in
which the courts have addressed the substantive issues regarding
the eligibility requirement imposed by the NCAA. 134 The courts in
Ganden and Bowers concluded that "complete abandonment of the
'core course' requirement would fundamentally alter the nature of
the privilege of participation in the NCAA's intercollegiate athletic
program."1 5 The Ganden court reasoned, and the Bower court
agreed, that the "core course" requirements serve important inter-
ests of the NCAA. 136
Applying the ADA's "reasonable accommodation" standard to
the NCAA, moreover, the Matthews court held that ordering any
further accommodation would require the NCAA to dispense with
essential eligibility criteria, which would exceed the accommoda-
tion required by the ADA.137
132. See Ganden, 1996 WL 680000, at *13 (discussing whether plaintiff quali-
fies as otherwise qualified individual given circumstances).
133. See Pottgen v. Miss. State High Sch. Activities Ass'n, 40 F.3d 926, 929 (8th
Cir. 1994) ("A Rehabilitation Act analysis requires the court to determine both
whether an individual meets all of the essential eligibility requirements and
whether reasonable modifications exist.") (emphasis in original).
134. See Ganden, 1996 WL 680000, at *13; Bowers v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic
Ass'n, 974 F. Supp. 459, 459 (D. N.J 1997); Matthews v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic
Ass'n, 79 F. Supp. 1199, 1199 (E.D. Wash. 1999).
135. Bowers, 974 F. Supp. at 467 (agreeing with Ganden decision that abandon-
ment of "core course" requirement would fundamentally alter participation
privilege).
136. See id. (concurring with Ganden assertion that inclusion of "core course"
requirements kept intact NCAA aims); Ganden, 1996 WL 680000, at *14 (noting
removal of requirement would substantively change nature of programr). These
interests are to "(1) insure that student-athletes are representative of the college
community and recruited solely for athletics; (2) insure that a student-athlete is
academically prepared to succeed at college; and (3) preserve amateurism in inter-
collegiate sports." Id.
137. See Matthews, 1999 WL 1256262, at *7. In this case, a learning disabled
plaintiff had requested and been denied a waiver from the NCAA relating to the
"75/25 rule", which requires all student athletes to earn 75% of the minimum
number of semester hours during the winter session and no more that 25% in the
summer session. The NCAA had previously given the plaintiff two waivers of this
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1. Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc.
In Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc. ("Martin l'),138 Casey Martin, a
twenty-five-year-old golfer with Klippel-Trenaunay-Weber Syn-
drome, sought a preliminary injunction that would force the PGA
to allow him to use a cart during the third round of a qualifying
school tournament.1 3 9 The Martin I court granted the preliminary
injunction and extended the injunction to include the first two
tournaments on the Nike Tour.14°
The PGA Tour filed a motion for summary judgment asserting
that it is exempt from the ADA because it is a private nonprofit
establishment.1 4 1 In the alternative, the PGA Tour claimed that the
"PGA and the Nike Tour competitions do not constitute 'places of
public accommodation,' and that the Nike Tour is not an examina-
tion or course."142 Martin filed a cross motion for partial summary
judgment claiming that (1) the PGA is a private entity "which is or
operates a place of public accommodation;" (2) the PGA is a "pri-
vate entity that offers examinations or courses related to applica-
tions... for professional or trade purposes;" and (3) the PGA is an
employer as defined in the ADA. 143
The Martin I court ruled in favor of Martin, holding that the
PGA was not exempt as a "private club" from the ADA and that the
PGA operated a place of public accommodation.1 4 4 The court rea-
soned that the PGA, like all professional sports organizations, is a
commercial enterprise in existence to generate money for its mem-
bers. 14 5 Furthermore, the PGA is "part of the entertainment indus-
rule but argued that the current rejection was based on his lack of improvement in
academics.
138. 984 F. Supp. 1320 (D. Or. 1998).
139. See id. (describing disability of plaintiff). Klippel-Trenaunay-Weber Syn-
drome is a congenital deformity that curtails the flow of blood circulation in the
plaintiff's right leg, which in turn, prevents the plaintiff from walking through
eighteen holes of golf. See id. The PGA Tour rules permit the use of carts in the
first two rounds of the Qualifying School Tournament as well as in the Senior PGA
Tour. See Martin II, 994 F. Supp. 1242, 1248 n.9 (D. Or. 1998).
140. See Martin I, 984 F. Supp. at 1322 (stating prior procedural history, not-
ing current issue is resolution of summary judgment motions).
141. See id. at 1323 (discussing PGA's claim that it qualified as organization
exempt from ADA).
142. Id. (commenting on defendant's arguments).
143. See id (noting plaintiffs three contentions).
144. See id. at 1326 (stating golf course directly qualifies as place of public
accommodation).
145. See Martin I, 984 F. Supp. 1320, 1323 (D. Or. 1998) (discussing elements
that qualified PGA Tour as commercial enterprise).
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try," and offers athletic events to the general public. 146 Therefore,
without the public's participation at the competitions, the PGA
could not be profitable. 147
The court distinguished Welsh, a case cited by the PGA, stating
that the PGA's membership purpose of generating money for its
members was unlike the membership purpose of the Boy Scouts,
which is to guide youths in the path of maturity.148 Because the
membership purposes were sufficiently disparate, the court held
that it was clear that the Boy Scouts was not what Congress intended
to protect when it excluded private clubs from the ADA.149 The
court then analyzed the variables commonly used by the courts in
determining whether an organization is a private entity and con-
cluded that the PGA was not a private club. 150
Next, the Martin I court addressed the PGA's argument that
the courses it operates were "not open to the 'general public' be-
tween the boundaries of play during its tournaments, and thus the
tournament events were not places of 'public accommodations.'- 151
The Martin I court summarily rejected this argument, noting that
the PGA conducts its tournaments at golf courses, which are specifi-
cally considered "places of public accommodation" under the
ADA.152 Accordingly, an operator of a "public place of accommo-
dation," in this case the PGA operating golf courses, cannot create
private enclaves within the facility of public accommodation. 153
The Martin I court concluded that the PGA was not exempt "as a
private club" from ADA coverage because its tournaments were con-
146. See id. (offering support for assertion that without public participation,
PGA Tour could not succeed in its purpose).
147. See id. (noting that without public, revenue would not be generated and
would not fulfill expectations of its members).
148. See id. at 1324 (distinguishing holding of case cited by defendant, noting
that case undermines appellee's position).
149. See id. (stating some factors used by courts in deciding whether organiza-
tion is private entity, including genuine selectivity, membership control, history of
organization and use by nonmembers).
150. See Martin , 984 F. Supp. 1320, 1324-26 (D. Or. 1998) (discussing various
factors and court's analysis of those factors). The nature of professional sports is
to remove inferior players, but this "selectivity" does not confer "privacy" on these
organizations. See id. at 1325. Membership control depends on how well a golfer
performs, not on votes. See id Individuals other than members use the PGA's
facilities during tournament and to disallow a disabled person access would run
contrary to the purpose of the ADA. See id.
151. Id. at 1326.
152. See id. (noting golf course is specifically mentioned under statute defin-
ing public accommodations).
153. See id, at 1326-27 (discussing defendant's faulty assertion that it is not
public accommodation).
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ducted at places - golf courses - that were specifically included
within the definition of places of "public accommodation," and
hence subject to the ADA.154
At trial (Martin II), the PGA argued that the court should focus
on whether an athletic rule is substantive. 15 5 The PGA claimed
that, if a rule is substantive, it "cannot be modified without working
a fundamental alteration of the competition. '156 The court fol-
lowed the holding of Johnson v. Florida High School Activities Associa-
tion and concluded that an individualized inquiry into the necessity
of the walking rule was required to determine whether the rule
could be modified without fundamentally altering the game. 157
In this inquiry, the court questioned the importance and signif-
icance of the walking rule.1 58 The court noted that the PGA allows
the use of carts "at two of the four types of tournaments it
stages. ' 15 9 At those events, "no handicap system or stroke penalties
were imposed upon players that chose to use carts."160 Further-
more, the walking requirement is not expressly required in the
"Rules of Golf."161 In fact, this requirement is contained only in the
Rules of Golf Appendix.1 62
154. See id. (noting that it still defers to trial issue of whether Martin is em-
ployee of Tour and whether Nike Tour constitutes examination or course under
ADA).
155. See Martin II, 994 F. Supp. 1242, 1246 (D. Or. 1998). A substantive ath-
letic rule is "a rule which defines who is eligible to compete or a rule which gov-
erns how the game is to be played." Id.
156. Id. (noting defendant's argument in support of assertion that court
should follow "substantive" analysis in ruling upon athletic rules).
157. See id. (discussing whether modification of rule for plaintiffs benefit
would fundamentally alter game); Johnson v. Fla. High Sch. Activities Ass'n Inc.,
899 F. Supp. 579, 579 (M.D. Fla. 1995), vacated as moot, 102 F.3d 1172 (11th Cir.
19970. In this case, a nineteen-year-old disabled high school student-athlete
sought a waiver of the athletic association's age-eligibility rule. In holding that
waiving the age-eligibility requirement did not fundamentally alter the nature of
purpose of the program, the court stated that the most appropriate analysis in
making this determination was through an individualized assessment.
158. See Martin II, 994 F. Supp. at 1250-51 (discussing purpose of "walking
rule" in golf).
159. Id. at 1251 (commenting that two tours allow use of carts without
penalty).
160. Id. at 1248 (noting no penalties were allotted to players who chose to use
carts).
161. Id. "[T]he general 'Rules of Golf are promulgated by the United States
Golf Association and the Royal Ancient Golf Club of St. Andrews, Scotland." Id. at
1249. These rules govern the PGA and Nike Tour tournaments, subject to modifi-
cations by the PGA Tour. See Martin II, 994 F. Supp. at 1249.
162. See id. The appendix to a pamphlet entitled "Conditions of Competition
and Local Rules" state that the PGA Tour Rules Committee can permit golfers to
ride. See id. This Committee has never granted a waiver for individualized circum-
stances like a disability. See id.
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Second, the Martin II court accepted the PGA's assertion that
the purpose of the walking rule is to inject the element of fatigue
into the skill of shot making.163 However, the court explained that
when the severity of Martin's disability is taken into consideration,
walking any amount of distance, even from a cart to the ball, causes
him to endure greater fatigue than a normal person.1 64 Moreover,
the court stated that the real fatigue that PGA golfers battle is not
walking eighteen holes, but rather the mental aspect of playing the
game of golf.16 5
Finally, the court commented on the paradoxical nature of the
PGA's argument. 166 On one hand, the PGA asserted that making
an individualized assessment regarding Martin's disability and the
necessity of the walking rule was inappropriate.1 67 On the other
hand, during oral argument, counsel for PGA conceded that an in-
dividualized assessment would be necessary when determining a
coach's appropriate role for a blind golfer during a tournament. 16s
Consequently, the court held that allowing Martin to use a cart was
a reasonable modification in light of his disability.169
III. CONCLUSION
While it is too early to evaluate the long-term effects that the
Martin decisions will have on professional, collegiate and high
school sports, the immediate effect has been to elevate awareness
regarding the scope of the ADA's reach. After this decision, it
should be clear to the sports industry that the ADA applies, in some
manner, to all sports. This observation is best illustrated in the Mar-
tin II opinion, when the court stated that the "ADA does not distin-
guish between sports organizations and other entities .... [T]he
disabled have just as much interest in being free from discrimina-
163. See Martin II, 994 F. Supp. 1242, 1250-51 (D. Or. 1998) (agreeing with
defendant that fatigue plays factor in game of golf).
164. See id. at 1251-52 (noting that in addition to greater fatigue plaintiff suf-
fers, with every step plaintiff takes, there is risk of fracturing tibia and
hemorrhaging).
165. See id. at 1251 (discussing evidence that waiking is used to deal with "psy-
chological factors of fatigue").
166. See id. at 1253 (concluding that plaintiffs use of cart is not unreasonable
accommodation under ADA).
167. See id. (commenting on "paradox" of PGA's position).
168. See Martin II, 994 F. Supp. 1242, 1249 (D. Or. 1998) (restating one aspect
of PGA Tour's argument).
169. See id. at 1253 (commenting on conflicting viewpoint in PGA counsel's
response to query).
1999] 263
21
Cook: The Americans with Disabilities Act and Its Application to High S
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1999
264 VILLANOVA SPORTS & ENT. LAw JOURNAL [Vol. 6: p. 243
don in the athletic world as they do in other aspects of everyday
life."' 7 0
Although legal commentators have differed on the effect this
case will have on the sports realm, some commentators opine that
"the Martin case may serve as a Magna Carta for disabled athletes in
professional sports," the ramifications are uncertain. 171 What is cer-
tain is that, nine years after passage of the ADA, it is now possible
for a professional golfer to walk the eighteenth green at Augusta
with a disabled golfer, perhaps even Casey Martin, riding in a gas-
motorized cart.
170. Id. at 1246 (summarizing court's holding).
171. See id.
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